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Chinese AI labs trained models on U.S.-banned Nvidia chips, analysis shows

Key takeaways

  • Analysis of openly released models from DeepSeek and Moonshot AI found evidence that leading Chinese AI labs trained on U.S.-banned Nvidia Blackwell GPUs, despite official export restrictions.
  • Megaspeed and related entities operated a pipeline routing restricted chips to Chinese companies via Malaysian data centers, with approximately 275,000 Nvidia accelerators imported there in 2024–2025.
  • Jensen Huang's departure from Nvidia follows disclosure of connections to Megaspeed, which faces investigation for chip smuggling, creating potential corporate liability if export violations were known internally.
  • Roughly 600,000 H200 chips remain held in Hong Kong without import clearance, while China responds to export bans by investing in domestic semiconductor development.

Leading AI models developed by Chinese companies show signs of having been trained on Nvidia’s Blackwell GPUs, hardware explicitly banned from export to China, according to research that highlights a major gap in U.S. technology restrictions. The finding suggests that export controls meant to preserve American artificial intelligence dominance are not preventing access to the most powerful chips.

Will DePue, a former OpenAI researcher now leading the nonprofit Unemployment Labs, analyzed the underlying structure of openly released models from DeepSeek, Moonshot AI, MiniMax, and Ant Group. By examining the weights—the mathematical parameters that retain information about which hardware trained them—DePue identified characteristics consistent with Blackwell GPU training in DeepSeek’s V4 models and Moonshot’s Kimi K3 releases.

Michael Kratsios, the White House technology adviser, previously stated that Moonshot AI had used export-banned chips, citing U.S. intelligence sources. The development challenges the stated purpose of the export regime, which restricts Blackwell shipments to China and Chinese-owned companies while allowing sales of the less powerful H200 GPU only through a routing arrangement that permits the U.S. to apply a 25% tariff.

The smuggling pipeline

Megaspeed, a company that operates through its subsidiary Speedmatrix, has been at the center of chip diversion efforts for several years and faces investigations from both U.S. and Singaporean authorities. In May, short-seller Culper released a report claiming Nvidia faced a substantial “China problem” because a large portion of its revenue came from Chinese demand, often routed through remote data centers or diverted through channels that violate U.S. law. Culper detailed Megaspeed’s relationship with Nvidia and alleged that Alice Huang’s companies receive backing from Chinese firms prohibited from accessing American chips.

According to Bloomberg reporting, a company with connections to Alice Huang was involved in smuggling banned Nvidia chips to a data center in Shanghai. Megaspeed and its operations have drawn regulatory attention as the nexus point between Chinese AI labs and restricted semiconductors.

The Malaysia workaround

The research organization Epoch AI estimates that roughly two million advanced chips entered China during 2024 and 2025 through schemes designed to obscure their destination. However, these chips often do not physically travel to mainland China. Instead, Chinese companies access them through offshore data centers, particularly in Malaysia, which has become the primary location for circumventing restrictions. Epoch estimates that 275,000 Nvidia AI accelerators were imported into Malaysia in 2024 and 2025, enabling Chinese firms to train models on banned hardware while technically operating outside China’s borders.

Sam Bresnick, a researcher at Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology, told TechCrunch that the offshore route effectively nullifies the intent of export controls. “If we care about the U.S. tech edge, it doesn’t make any sense to me that you would not allow Chinese companies to access chips in mainland China or Hong Kong and Macau, but then say, actually, if you just go over to Malaysia, you can do whatever you want,” Bresnick said.

Corporate liability and leadership

Jensen Huang departed from Nvidia following the disclosure of personal relationships with executives and a customer, issues that carry broader implications for the company’s export control compliance. The CEO’s connections to Alice Huang, whose companies are implicated in chip smuggling, create potential legal exposure if federal investigators determine that prohibited technology transfers occurred and that Huang was aware of them. Nvidia and Huang both previously endorsed Megaspeed’s data centers and stated that Nvidia officials had visited the facilities to verify their legitimacy.

The potential corporate liability likely influenced Nvidia’s decision to part ways with Huang, independent of public attention to his personal affairs. U.S. companies generally have limited obligations to monitor what customers do with controlled goods after purchase, but executive knowledge of violations combined with business relationships raises the stakes for enforcement action.

Regulatory scrutiny

Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, who oversees the agencies responsible for licensing chip exports, faces potential dismissal following reports that his investigators failed to identify suspicious chip purchasers and maintained overly close working relationships with Nvidia officials. The apparent gap between the scale of chip flows to China—documented through multiple research efforts—and the enforcement response has drawn attention from Congress and the White House.

Detailed close-up of a GeForce GTX graphics card showing hardware components.

The stockpile question

Approximately 600,000 H200 chips remain stockpiled in Hong Kong awaiting clearance for import into China. While Chinese companies have expressed interest in acquiring the hardware, no consensus explanation exists for why the chips have not been authorized for entry. Graham Webster, a research scholar at Stanford focusing on U.S.-China technology policy, questioned whether withholding chips would accelerate Chinese domestic production, given the scale of overall demand. Alternative theories for the hold-up include preparation for a potential trade agreement involving large-volume U.S. goods purchases or concerns regarding potential surveillance features embedded in the chips.

The domestic response

The export bans have prompted China to recommit resources to developing its own semiconductor industry rather than relying on imported American chips. Culper’s short-selling thesis centered not on expected U.S. government enforcement but on China’s industrial response to the restrictions, betting that billions of dollars in Chinese demand for Nvidia chips could decline if domestic alternatives mature. The competing incentives—preventing Chinese access to advanced chips while maintaining revenue from Chinese customers through offshore channels—have created a structural conflict that current policy has failed to resolve.

Source: TechCrunch

Frequently Asked Questions

How did researchers determine that Chinese models used banned Nvidia chips?

Will DePue from Unemployment Labs analyzed the weights—the underlying mathematical structure—of openly released models from DeepSeek, Moonshot AI, MiniMax, and Ant Group. The weights retain information about the hardware that trained them, and Dépue found characteristics consistent with Blackwell GPU training in DeepSeek V4 and Moonshot Kimi K3 releases.

How do Chinese companies access banned Nvidia chips legally?

Chinese companies use offshore data centers, primarily in Malaysia, to access the chips without violating the rule that chips cannot be shipped to mainland China or Chinese-owned firms. Epoch AI estimates 275,000 Nvidia AI accelerators were imported to Malaysia in 2024 and 2025 for this purpose.

What is the connection between Jensen Huang and chip smuggling?

Jensen Huang departed Nvidia following disclosure of personal relationships with executives and a customer. His connections to Alice Huang, whose companies are implicated in chip smuggling through Megaspeed, create potential corporate liability if federal investigators determine that prohibited transfers occurred and that Huang was aware of them.

Written by
Nathan Cole

Nathan Cole covers financial markets — equities, exchange rates, and monetary policy. He tracks central bank decisions and explains what each rate move actually means for everyday investors.